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WAGE SETTING IN THE PORTUGUESE LABOR MARKET:
A MICROECONOMIC APPROACH*
Pedro Portugal**
“Portuguese businessmen have stopped investing and stopped working on projects. They do not see
any markets; they do not see the cheap labour there used to be; they do not see infrastructures being
developed; they receive no clear signals from the State; they do not believe that the existing economic
policy is either permanent or viable. Thus have they launched the Portuguese economy into uncer-
tainty and decadence. A recession born of circumstances? No; rather a deep-seated, complex de-
mand for change in structures and in the economic, political and social system.”
“A rigorous analysis carried out around 1960 would have made it clear that the Portuguese develop-
ment model, over what could in certain respects be a medium-term period, will play itself out.”
Para onde vai a economia portuguesa?
Francisco Pereira de Moura (1969).
1. INTRODUCTION
It wouldseem to be generallyaccepted in Portugal that “the economic model based on low wageshas
played itself out.” This proposition presupposes that there is an economic development model that
characterises the Portuguese economy; that this model hinges on low wages; and that it has inexora-
bly played itself out. The reason why this concept has been so generally accepted would seem to be
the reasoning that a model based on high wages was the only logical outcome of the end of a model
based on low wages.
The low-wagemodel and its end is, however, one of those common-sense notions for which there can
be found no grounds in economic analysis. It seems in fact to be above all an echo of philosophical
concepts derivedfrom Hegel’s dialectic:that deepinsideanynewsocialmodeltherearethecontradic-
tions that will inevitably lead to its downfall.
Economic models are abstract constructs. They are veryuseful in providinga simplifiedwayof helping
us understand the fundamental mechanisms underlying the behaviour of economic agents. In this
sense, an economic model is not “real” in the way that, for example, a pair of shoes is based on a real
model. It is very debatable whetheryoucan classify an economic model on the basis of such a confus-
ing concept as “a low wage model playing itself out.”
When the idea of low wages is expressed, the issue is obviously: low in relation to what? For a labour
economist,the notionof a low(or high)wageis veryspecific. In microeconomicterms, wagesare lowif
they are set below the value of marginal productivity and high if they are above. The value of marginal
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** Economic Research Department.productivity represents the gain for the firm resulting from recruiting (or dismissing) another worker. It
marks out a clear dividing line in the wage bargaining process. This function therefore defines firm la-
bour demand. In the aggregate, if the wages paid by firms are too low, labour will become scarce, a
phenomenon known in Portugal since at least 1410.
1
Setting wages is clearly more complex than what stems purely and simply from a balance between la-
bour force supply and demand. The dynamics of such supply and demand do, however, have a deci-
siveeffect onthe waywagesmove. If wagebargaininginvolves,at leastat a first stage,a confrontation
betweenemployersandtradeunionassociations,thenitisbetterdescribedasplayingoutanon-coop-
erative game, in a bilateral monopoly situation, leading to agreement on wages, employment levels
and possibly redundancypayouts. It is this approach, and not a normative appreciation of what wages
should be, that will provide a guideline for the empirical investigation of what determines wages in
Portugal, presented in the following sections.
2. THE ARCHITECTURE OF THE WAGE BARGAINING SYSTEM IN THE
PORTUGUESE LABOUR MARKET
Private sector workers’payin Portugal is conditionedbythe definitionof twothresholds. The first is the
national minimum wage, specifying a floor for the majority of the labour force.
2 The second is defined
by the wage bargaining between employers’ and trades union associations, leading to a “salary table”
with the minimum wage for each professional group.
Determining these salary tables is the central, but not the only, element in the bargaining process. It
may result from agreements at sectoral level (majority), or from company or multi-company agree-
ments. In legal terms, the agreement is only binding on the parties in the negotiations – the workers
who are unionised and the companies within the employer associations – but the Ministry of Labour
and Social Security systematically uses government decrees (portarias) to extend the collective
agreement to all companies and workers in the sector.
It is often in the interest of companies to paytheir workersabovethe goingrate set out in the table. The
main reason why companies guarantee higher wages than the norm is to prevent a drain of workers
who have been selected and trained and have shownaptitude for their particular jobs. The handling of
this cushion (the difference between the contractual rate and the actual rate) provides the company
with a human resource management tool and some leeway to soften any negative shocks in demand
for their product. In the Portuguese labour market, companies do in fact pay their workers significantly
more than the contractual wage negotiated in the collective contract.
3
3. THE MINIMUM WAGE AND WAGE DISTRIBUTION IN PORTUGAL
Minimum wagelegislationwasintroducedin 1974, whencertain exceptionswereallowed.These were
gradually brought into the process.
4 In October 2004, 7.8 per cent of full-time employed workers in the
private sector were on the minimum wage. This was around 49.3 per cent of average base pay and
41.5 per cent of total pay. The minimumwageis clearlya decisivefactor on the left tail of wagedistribu-
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(1) IntheLisbonparliamentofAugust1410,“[theparticipants]…complainedthattherewereguardsofthecastle,becausepaywassolow,leadingtothecities
and towns of the realm being poorly guarded” quoted in Itinerários de el-rei D. João I, by Humberto Baquero Moreno, 1988.
(2) This excludes the handicapped and apprentices.
(3) Cardoso and Portugal (2005) put this wage cushion at 30-40% of contractual rate.
(4) For example, small companies, the young and farmers were not included.tion. It does not allowwagedispersion at the cost of an heavyleft tail of the wagedistribution (Chart 1).
The influence of the minimum wage on wage distribution in the labour market means that high wage
dispersion is essentially generated by the right tail of the distribution (Machado and Mata, 2005).
The effect of the minimum wage on employment has been the subject of heated discussion among
economists. Theoretically, if there is competition in the factors market, the imposition of a minimum
wage above the competitive equilibrium wage will inevitably lead to job losses, above all in the sector
covered by the minimum wage. However, in a monopsony, where the employer has some capacity to
set wage levels, it is well-known that setting a minimum wage can increase employment.
5
Empirical research on this topic has accumulated a vast repositoryof contradictoryresults. Some indi-
cate that jobs are lost, others point to nil effects on employment or even a slight gain. In Portugal, the
minimum wage was extended to the under-20s in 1987 and allows us to study the impact of the mini-
mum wagein almost idealconditions.The measureinvolveda bigrise in the wage(between33 and50
per cent) for a specific group. Two opposite effects are clear from a detailed study of the influence of
this measure on the gross flow of workers, using the “Quadros de Pessoal”( QP), a longitudinal data
set matching firms and workers in the Portuguese economy. On the one hand we have severance, on
the other accessions; the employmentgenerated by newcompanies and the employmentlost through
company closures (see Table 1) (Portugal and Cardoso 2006). The proportion of young people re-
cruited fell, both in new companies and in those already in operation. At the same time, there was an
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Source: Quadros de Pessoal.
(5) Inamoregeneralsense,wecanaddtothepowerofmonopsonythehurdlesplacedonworkermobility(forexample,thecostoffindinganotherjob).Inother
words, any mechanism that makes it more difficult for workers to opt for a move increases the negotiating power of the company.increase in the proportion of young people in companies which closed. However, the proportion of
youngjob losers in existingcompaniesfell significantlyand more than offset the negativeeffect on em-
ployment in other flows. This led to a positive net effect. To put it bluntly, the 1987 extension of the
minimum wage led to a significant net employment gain for young people.
4. CONTRACTUAL WAGES, ACTUAL WAGES AND THE WAGE CUSHION
The wage bargaining process between trades unions and employers’ associations is built on conven-
tions andgivesthe unionsa crucialrolein that theyare ableto pushfor an egalitarianwagedistribution
structure. From this angle, the thrust of the unions will be towards more wage compression and away
from pay as a function of productivity among workers and companies.
If weadmit that contractual wages,i.e. wagesnegotiated through collective agreements, reflect above
all the preferences of unions and that the wage cushion (defined as the difference between the con-
tractual wage and the actual wage) illustrates above all the pay policies defined by companies them-
selves, then we are in a position to analyse two distinct preferences relating to the pattern of wage
distribution.
The study of the factors determining contractual wages and the wage cushion, based on regression
analysis, shows that worker attributes have a muted influence on the behaviour of agreed wages
(Cardoso and Portugal, 2005). The wage cushion, however, significantly amplifies the effect of these
variables, mitigating to some extent the wage compression favoured by the unions (T able 2).
The distribution of contractual wages shows clearly the preference of workers’ representatives for an
egalitarian distribution (reducing the range of wages) but this is offset by the wage cushion, which ac-
centuates the dispersion, above all on the right tail of the distribution.
Banco de Portugal | Economic Bulletin
Autumn 2006 | Articles
92
Table 1
EFFECT OF THE CHANGE IN MINIMUM WAGE ON WORKER FLOWS
Fraction of teenagers in worker flows
Accessions Separations New firms Closures
1988 -0.037 -0.15 -0.042 0.05
(0.01) (0.01) (0.018) (0.023)
1989 -0.043 -0.14 -0.041 0.025
(0.01) (0.01) (0.018) (0.023)
Reference: 1986
Number of firms 99 608 125 397 38 138 19 203
Note:Poissonregressionwithrandomeffects. Eachregressionincludescompanysite,ameasurement ofindustrialconcentration, 7sectoralvariablesandavariableforforeigncompa-
nies. Standard errors in brackets.5. RENT SHARING AND THE ROLE OF INSIDERS AND OUTSIDERS IN
WAGE SETTING
Aconsiderablebranch of the literature focuses on the internalfactors of the companyin setting wages.
Again we must consider the monopolistic situation which allows for the generation of rents that will be
shared between owners and workers, modified by the negotiating power of the two sides. In this theo-
retical framework, it makes sense to tie wages to company performance indicators (profits,
productivity, cash flow, etc).
Once the distinction between insider and outsider factors in a company is established, there is scope
for an interesting analysis of the distinction between insider and outsider workers. The idea is that
wages are fundamentally set by incumbent workers (insiders) while those not on contract (outsiders)
have a relatively minor role to play. There are costs associated with selection, recruitment and training
of insiders, making it economically unviable to replace them with jobless at lower wages. The rent as-
sociated with replacement costs guarantees insider bargaining power in wage negotiations.
The insider-outsider theory of wage setting allows us to put forward an explanation for setting wages
above the market equilibrium level. Wage insensitivity to labour market conditions, and above all un-
employment, can entail hysteresis caused by the power of insiders. In this case, contemporary unem-
ploymentdepends on past unemployment,leading to a negative relation betweencontemporarywage
levels and past employment levels.
An approach to an insider-outsider model to set wages (Table 3) was undertaken on the basis of a
panel of companies with at least 100 workers, provided by the Ministry of Labour and Social Solidarity
(CarneiroandPortugal,2006).Results from this approachshowthat nominalproductivityhas a signifi-
cant impact on wage setting with an 18% weight for internal factors. This is fairly high by international
standards.
6 Market share also affects wages, suggesting that power in the product market creates
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Table 2
WAGE DETERMINANTS - MARGINAL EFFECTS
Regressors Dependent variable
Contractual wage Wage cushion Actual wage
(A) (B) (A+B)
Nominal productivity (log) 0.026 0.021 0.057
Schooling 0.016 0.019 0.047
Age 0.02 0.011 0.034
Age squared -0.0002 -0.001 -0.0003
Seniority 0.004 0.001 0.006
Seniority <1 year -0.019 -0.024 -0.051
Gender (female = 1) -0.109 -0.128 -0.204
Size of the firm (log) 0.028 0.008 0.036
Age of firm -0.0003 -0.0001 -0.0005
Turnover rate 0.001 0.007 0.014
Number of observations 1 134 427 1 134 427 1 134 427
R² 0.54 0.3 0.59
Note:EstimationbymaximumlikelihoodoftheTobitregressionmodel.Eachregressionincludes5measuresofunionpower,3variablesindicatingextensionofthecollectiveagreement,
3 regional variables and 17 sectoral variables. Source: Quadros de Pessoal, 1999.
(6) The long-term figure for internal weight is calculated by dividing the coefficient of nominal productivity by one less the coefficient of the lagged wage.rents that are also picked up by workers in the form of bigger wages. The negative relation between
wage variation and the unemployment rate suggests that outsider power has an important part to play
in wagesetting becauseit affects the alternativeoptions of others in the bargainingprocess. There are
no signs of hysteresis when the importance of insiders is measured through the variation in employ-
ment of workers on secure contracts. As a last point, the positive effect on wages from the rate of la-
bour use and the negative effect from the rate of layoffs seem to bolster the idea that the threat of
dismissal weakens worker bargaining power and brings wages down.
6. DISPLACEMENT RISK AND WAGE DETERMINATION
In a labour market with Portugal’s level of sclerosis, where the likelihood of finding a suitable place of
workis very lowand unemploymentduration therefore very high, being dismissed is an extremelydra-
matic event (Blanchard and Portugal, 2001). In this context it is possible to envisage a bargaining sce-
nario involving workers’ and employers’ representatives where a compromise is reached with
companysurvivalinmind.Here,wagelevelsarebalancedagainstthelikelihoodof a jobbeinglost with
closure. Wages in this way have a bearing on the occurrence of the discrete terminal event that re-
duces employment to zero. This brings us to a point where company survival hangs in the balance. At
the same time, the likelihoodof closure affects the setting of wagesthroughout the bargainingprocess
and if there is a negative shock on demand for the product, wage concessions will be on the table. So,
ifwagesarecompletelydeterminedbytheminimumwage,thewage-concessionprocesswillcollapse.
The study of Carneiro and Portugal (again using the QP individual records), reached the conclusion
that the quasi-elasticity of labour demand through company job losses due to closure was in the order
of 0.15. This means that an exogenous variation on wages of 10% will increase the likelihood of clo-
sure by 1.5 per cent. In turn, the worker faced with the average likelihood of closure (6.3 per cent) will
receive duringthe yearbefore closure a wage6 per cent lowerthan that receivedin a companywithno
closure in sight. As a final point, companies with a large proportion of minimum wage earners face a
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Table 3
WAGE SETTING - INSIDER OUTSIDER MODEL
Dependent variable: log wages
Regressors Regression coefficient t statistic
Wages lagged 0.227 7.4
Nominal productivity 0.143 6.1
Growth in permanent employment -0.096 -5.8
Market share 0.018 4.3
Temporary employment -0.019 -0.6
Rate of labour use 0.318 2.5
Layoff rate -0.022 -5.3
Unemployment rate -0.123 -5.9
Number of companies 4330
Note: GMM estimation. Each regression includes 4 categories of schooling, 5 of professional qualification and 5 temporal dummies.larger risk of closure, since there is no scope for wageconcessions. An increase of 10% of workersre-
ceiving the minimum wage corresponds to a 0.6 per cent rise in the likelihood of company closure.
Faced with a negative shock which changes firm’s survival frontier, workers can, in certain circum-
stances, make concessions to cut down the risk of displacement. In many cases, however, closure
cannot be avoidedand the workersare faced withsignificantwagelosses afterwardsJob losses mean
that the investment in human capital specific to the company has gone, i.e. the investment that made
the worker more productive in the company but cannot be transferred to other companies. Workers
also lose the investment in the search for a job suited to their productive capacities (job matching).
There are also strategies frequentlyused to put off the paymentof a highersalaryto the periodnearing
the end of a career, basing this on the length of service of a worker. This is a way of disincentivating
lowerperformance and also leads to wagelosses wheneverworkerschange jobs. As a last point, pro-
longed unemployment tends to lead to a human capital depreciation and stigmatisation among
employers.
Carneiro and Portugal (2006b) carried out a study comparing the evolution of wages among workers
dismissed as a result of company closure with wages for workers in companies that did not close and
could therefore serve as a control group. The QP micro data on staff was also used. The conclusion
wasthat three yearsafter closure, the wagedifferential betweenthe twogroups was10 p.p. for women
and 12 p.p. for men. If there is a period of unemployment,the differential rises by 3 p.p. for womenand
6 p.p. for men. The major part of wagelosses (40 to 46 per cent) lies in fact that human capital specific
to the company disappears. Change in the sector of activity weighssignificantlyon the wagesof work-
ers who find new jobs (14 to 24 per cent), and there is also a distinct behavioural difference between
those who find a new job straight away and those who go through a period without a job. Being unem-
ployed contributes 33 to 44 per cent of total wage loss. Aselection issue is raised however. It is possi-
ble to argue that the heaviest consequencesof companyclosure are hiddenin the near fifty per cent of
thosedismissedwhodidnotfindanewjob,and,thus, arenotontheQPstaffinglistthreeyearslater.
7. THE CYCLICAL BEHAVIOUR OF REAL WAGES
There is a vast literature on this subject. Howdo real wagesreact to changesin economicactivity?Ad-
justments to employment across the aggregate labour market demand curve cause a counter-cyclical
reaction in real wages. Alternatively, the intertemporal substitution of labour by leisure across the dy-
namic labour supply curve will generate a pro-cyclical sensitivity of real wages to business cycle.
Economists seem on the whole to agree that using aggregate data in research on the cyclical pattern
of wages does very little to clarify things. In fact, the use of aggregate wage data leads to a number of
variables intermingling to the point where they cannot be separated: the effects of the changes on
wagedispersion,onthe distributionof hoursworkedandonthe compositionof the labourforce. An ad-
ditionalimplicationfrom usingaggregatedata is that it assumesimplicitlythat the relationbetweenreal
wages and the business cycle is the same for all workers or groups of workers. Leaving aside the het-
erogeneityinthewagecyclesensitivitymayleadtoseriousproblemswhenundertakingthisanalysis.
The empirical evidence based on microeconomic longitudinal data allows us to overcome the prob-
lems of aggregate figures. From this came the generally accepted agreement that real wages behave
in a moderately pro-cyclicalway, more accentuated among workerswhomove betweenjobs (movers)
and much less among those who do not move (stayers).
Astudyof the labour market in Portugal, carried out byCarneiroand Portugal (2004), based on the QP
individual staffing records of 1986-1988, shows indeed a moderate cyclical sensitivity in real wages
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nificantly large pro-cyclical reaction in real wages among just hired workers. On the contrary, cyclical
sensibility is weak among workers who have left their companies (Table 4).
8. WAGE SETTING IN A LOW INFLATION (AND LOW PRODUCTIVITY)
REGIME
The notionof nominalrigidityof wagesis associatedwithbarriersto a nominalfall in wages(legal,con-
tractual and others). Since the 1950s, nominal wage cuts are forbidden in Portugal. This restriction,
however, does not create unsurmountable restrictions for companies seeking real wage concessions
belowthe inflationrate. In such a case it willbe enoughto ensurethat a nominalwageup-dateis below
inflation. The higher the inflation rate, the more leeway on wages is available for companies. In a
low-inflation regime, however, nominal wage rigidity may stop companies from adjusting to negative
product demand shocks through wage accommodations. The smaller the wage cushion (the differ-
ence between the wage actually paid and the wage agreed in collective pay bargaining) the more diffi-
cult this manipulation will become. A third area where there is leeway for adjustment could be in the
structure of total pay, which is made up of base pay, regular and occasional payments and overtime.
An empirical study of the wage variation distribution, in the absence of large measurement errors,
gives a convincing picture of the presence of nominal rigidity. Resistance to nominal negative varia-
tions in wages will mean sparse negative variations but if this cannot happen, there will be a rise in nil
variations.
In terms of recentdevelopments in the empiricaldistributionof wagevariations(from ananalysisof the
1999-2004 QP staffing figures) there are hardly any nominal negative variations (measured from base
pay) and a large mass point at wage variations equal to zero (Chart 2). The move towards more null
variations (from 13 per cent in 1999-2000 to 28 per cent in 2003-2004) is particularly revealing. This is
probably associated with low inflation and weak productivity growth. There is also a salient move to-
wardszerointhedistributionofwagevariations,correspondingapproximatelytotheexpectedinflation
rate accentuating even more the compression of the distribution. As a last point, it is clear that in 2004
the variation in total pay was less than in base pay. This shows that companies are having recourse to
an unusual way of adjusting wages negatively (Charts 3 and 4).
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Table 4
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: LOGARITHM OF REAL HOURLY WAGE
SAMPLE:
Cyclical variable Stayers Accessions Separations
Unemployment rate -1.16 -2.08 -0.6
(-9.7) (-16.1) (-2.8)
Number of observations 170 414 115 009 88 894
R² 0.5 0.42 0.44
Note:Thisregression isestimated forOLS. Each regression includes linearand quadratic trends, workerage and age squared, schooling and seven binaryvariables that identify levels
of qualification. ‘t’ statistics are in brackets.Economic Bulletin | Banco de Portugal
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Chart 3
Source: Quadros de Pessoal.
Chart 2
Source: Quadros de Pessoal.
DISTRIBUTION OF WAGE VARIATION (BASIC PAY)
DISTRIBUTION OF WAGE VARIATION (TOTAL PAY)9. CONCLUSIONS
The importance of minimum wage setting has been established in this analysis in the pattern of wage
distribution.The argumentwasthat a changeto the minimum wagehad mixedeffects on employment.
A breakdown of its effects in terms of gross worker flows is especially enlightening as a way of under-
standing better the range of reactions to minimum wage setting.
Portuguese firms often pay their workers above the contractual wage, ensuring a wage cushion which
can serve as an important mechanism for wage flexibility. The cushion can also serve as a buffer
against the egalitarian thrust on wage distribution by workers’ representatives.
Bothinternalandexternalfactorshaveabearingonwagesetting.InthePortuguesecase,rentsharing
betweenemployers and workers gives a relatively high importance to internal factors. In a labour mar-
ket wherethe loss of a job can be a serious problembecauseof the lowarrival rate of job offers, wages
are conditioned by fears of dismissal, among these the possibility of firm closure.
Among the external factors conditioning wage movements, the economic cycle plays a decisive role.
Leavingasidecompositionaleffects, realwagesfor Portugueseworkersarepro-cyclical,especiallyfor
starting wages.
The picture is of a country with extreme nominal wage rigidity. This nominal rigidity resides in the fact
that nominalwagescannotfall,asituationset downinlabourlegislation.Resistanceto acut innominal
Banco de Portugal | Economic Bulletin
Autumn 2006 | Articles
98
Chart 4
Source: Quadros de Pessoal.
DISTRIBUTION OF WAGE DRIFTwages is clearly visible in the empirical distribution of wage variations, where recent developments
showarisingdifficultyforcompaniestousewagesasaresponsetonegativeproductdemandshocks.
Throughout this brief digression on the behaviour of wagesin the Portuguese labour market there has
never been any suggestion that wages might have been set below their equilibrium value. Indeed, if
any evidence exists, it points in the opposite direction. In the public administration sector, the decision
on wages is defined in political terms, far from the confrontation between supply and demand. Here
there is strong evidence whencomparing like for like that the wagesof civil servants are set at a figure
far above the private sector (Portugal and Centeno, 2001). Excessive wage growth may also reside at
the root of the macroeconomic imbalances in the Portuguese economy (Blanchard, 2006).
In a discussion of what determines wages, it should alwaysbe borne in mind that labour contracts are
freely negotiated between employers and employees. The leeway for negotiations will be determined
by the conditions underlying company survival and by the workers’ reservation wage. Bargaining
power depends on a variety of factors, among them risk aversion (for example income fluctuations),
the capacity to inflict costs (for example through strike action) or asymmetric information (for example
on the company’s economic performance). And it is the bargaining power of the parties that will deter-
mine the final outcome. In this context, fancyingto replace the “lowwagemodel” for another economic
model is as frivolous as wishing to change a shoe design. The economic debate would in all likelihood
be more fruitful if it focused on the most suitable format for labour market institutions rather than on a
sterile contemplation of “an economic development model based on low wages playing itself out”.
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